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Abstract:  The goal of every program or project manager is to have a safe 
reliable product and to have an understanding of the residual risk of operating 
that product.  Two very important systems engineering analysis tools to achieve 
those objectives are Hazard Analysis and Failure Modes and Effects Analysis.  
Sometimes seen strictly as Safety and Reliability tasks, these analyses are key 
to a successful program or project and require input from all stakeholders.  When 
viewed in the Systems Engineering process, Safety and Reliability are truly 
specialty disciplines within Systems Engineering. Hazard Analysis is used to 
improve system safety while Failure Modes and Effects Analysis is used to 
identify ways to increase product reliability; both analyses are required to 
improve systems design and fully capture the risk for a system or program.  
Depending on how the analyses are scoped, there could be a perception of 
overlap and duplication of effort. This paper will present a systems engineering 
approach to show the need and benefits for performing both types of analyses. 
Both analysis processes are required to ensure that all possible hazardous 
conditions and failure modes have been identified and addressed to minimize 
overall risk to the program/project and to ensure a safe and reliable system. 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
There are many books on systems engineering that describe the overall 
systems engineering process and several of these books mention Failure Modes 
and Effects Analysis (FMEA) as well as Hazard Analysis, sometimes referred to 
as Safety Analysis.  These books generally point to the specialty engineering 
fields of reliability engineering and safety engineering as the “place to go” for how 
to perform these two analyses.  I don’t want to discount the contributions from the 
S&MA community; however, systems engineers need to be aware of these 
analysis processes and take advantage of them throughout the lifecycle of their 
system.  Often based on their past experiences, some systems engineers and 
project managers may jump to the conclusion that the results of the two analysis 
techniques are redundant and think that they can save resources by eliminating 
one of the processes.  Although there are some similarities in some of the terms 
and steps of the two analysis processes, they have different goals and yield 
different results.  The goal of FMEA Analysis is to make the system reliable and 
the goal of Hazard Analysis is to make the system safe.  Without considering 
both analysis techniques you could end up with a very reliable system that is 
unsafe or a very safe system that doesn’t work. 
Reliability, in a generic sense, can be defined as “the probability that a 
system or product will perform in a satisfactory manner for a given period of time 
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when used under specified operating conditions.”1  The field of reliability 
engineering seeks to: 
 Apply engineering knowledge and special techniques to prevent or 
reduce the likelihood or frequency of failures; 
 Identify and correct the causes of failures that do occur, despite the 
efforts to prevent them; 
 Determine ways of coping with failures that do occur, if their causes 
have not been corrected; 
 Apply methods for estimating the likely reliability of new designs, and 
for analyzing reliability data.2 
MIL-STD-882D Standard Practice for System Safety defines safety as 
freedom from those conditions that can cause death, injury, occupational illness, 
damage to or loss of equipment or property, or damage to the environment.  
System Safety Engineers employ specialized professional knowledge and skills 
in applying scientific and engineering principles, criteria, and techniques to 
identify and eliminate hazards, in order to reduce the associated mishap risk.3 
The purpose of this report is to show the importance of both FMEA 
Analysis and Hazard Analysis and how in the overall safety and mission success 
                                            
1 Blanchard, Benjamin.  Systems Engineering Management.  2
nd
.  New York: Wiley, 
1998. Print.  
2 O’Connor, Patrick D. T.  Practical Reliability Engineering. 4
th
. West Sussex: Wiley, 
2002. 2. Print. 
3 Department of Defense.  MIL-STD-882D Standard Practice for System Safety.  
Washington: Department of Defense.  2000. 2. Web 4 November 2010. 
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of a project and to show how both analyses are required to improve systems 
design and fully capture the risk for a system or program.  Depending on how the 
analyses are scoped, there could be a perception of overlap and duplication of 
effort. This paper will present a systems engineering approach show the need 
(and specific benefits) for performing both types of analyses. Both analysis 
processes are required to ensure that all possible hazardous conditions and 
failure modes have been identified and addressed to minimize overall risk to the 
program/project.   
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Chapter 2:  Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
WHAT IS FMEA? 
Many people use the term FMEA as a noun and as a verb.  FMEA the 
verb is the structured bottoms up intellectual process to evaluate a system 
design for possible failure modes and causes early in the design process so that 
mitigation options can be developed to “deal with” the causes of the failure mode.  
FMEA the noun is generally the documentation that captures the results of the 
analysis.  This section concentrates on FMEA the verb and will use the phrase 
FMEA Analysis to distinguish between the noun (the FMEA report) and the verb 
(the FMEA Analysis).  The process for FMEA Analysis is formally documented for 
general use in MIL-STD-1629A – Procedures for Performing a Failure Mode, 
Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA).  NASA calls the process FMEA/Critical 
Items List (CIL).    
FMEA Analysis should be performed by a multi-discipline team early in the 
design phase to aid in the evaluation of the design.  Used properly, FMEA 
Analysis will allow engineers to anticipate failure modes before they happen and 
to eliminate the failure mode with redesign or mitigate the effects of the failure by 
other means.   
During the design and development phase, when design criteria, mission 
requirements, and conceptual designs are being developed, the results of the 
FMEA Analysis are used to evaluate the design approach and to compare the 
benefits of competing design configurations. FMEA Analysis provides a 
systematic identification of failure modes and their associated causes for 
evaluation, as well as identifying potentially critical single failure points for 
possible elimination or mitigation. 
5 
 
As the mission and design definitions become more refined, FMEA 
Analysis is expanded to successively more detailed levels. When changes are 
made in the design to remove or reduce the impact of identified failure modes, 
FMEA Analysis must be repeated for redesigned portions to ensure that all 
predictable failure modes in the new design are considered. 
HISTORY OF FMEA AT NASA 
The idea of FMEA was developed by the United States Military and documented 
in Military Procedure MIL-P-1629 “Procedures for Performing a Failure Mode, 
Effects and Criticality Analysis” dated November 9, 1949.  The military used the 
analysis to evaluate the effect of system and equipment failures and then 
classified the failures according to their impact on mission success and safety.  
The Project Mercury and Gemini Programs had no reliability or quality assurance 
requirement documents that could be imposed contractually on the contractor.  
The Project Mercury and the Gemini Programs depended on their early 
spacecraft experience (e.g. X-Series aircraft programs) from National Committee 
for Aeronautics (NACA) and the contractor experience obtained from Department 
of Defense (DoD) aircraft and missile programs.4  The requirements were 
formalized during the Apollo Program when an engineer named Joe Levine, with 
a background in military flight tests, was tasked to develop requirements for 
reliability, quality and test. North American Corporation had just been awarded 
the contract for the spacecraft and there were no reliability documents.  It is 
important to note that safety analysis was not included at that time and it was 
only added after the Apollo 1 fire. Joe used MIL-R-27542 from the US Air Force, 
                                            
4 Levine, Joe, Marion Merrell and Jeff Adams. JSC SR&QA Evolution Resulting from 




which established the minimum essential contractor reliability effort to assure 
acceptable reliability in an Air Force system, as his starting point.  He wanted to 
improve reliability through test and analysis to verify requirements.  He also 
wanted to integrate quality and reliability into the overall systems engineering 
process.  He started promoting the idea of performing FMEA Analysis by asking 
the engineers, “How do you know that your design will work without failure?”  
Although initially the value of this analysis was not recognized, Joe continued 
promoting the process and began to show the engineers how the results of the 
FMEA Analysis would improve their designs.  Furthermore, he worked with the 
engineers to improve the test procedures to “test for” the failure modes that were 
identified.  The concept of “show me that the failure won’t occur” has grown into 
what is now known as retention rationale required for critical failure modes.5  
Each of the major manned space programs and the NASA field centers has 
established requirements and processes for application of the analysis to their 
products. 
OBSTACLES IN THE FMEA PROCESS 
Sometimes programs or projects do not see the value added in the FMEA 
process because the process has broken down.  In order to provide value to the 
program or project, the FMEA process needs to start early in an organized 
fashion with management support.  When discussing the value of FMEA with 
engineers from many different engineering disciplines, the responses ranged 
from “waste of time” and “I don’t want to do anything with it” to “powerful tool, 
effective way to prevent problems” and “needs to be done across the board.” 
There are many obstacles in the process: 
                                            
5 Levine, Joe. Personal Interview. 19 November 2008. 
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• Only one person assigned to do the analysis – Sometimes a 
manager will assign a reliability engineer the task of doing FMEA for a 
system.  This is ineffective as a team of one is seldom as successful 
as a team of the right people.  All of the stakeholders need to be 
involved – this is NOT just a Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) 
exercise, you need diverse representatives from the project team 
including but not limited to Design Engineering, S&MA, and 
Operations. 
• Design or process expert is not included in the FMEA team or is 
allowed to dominate the team – design engineering has to be 
included but cannot dominate the analysis process. 
• FMEA team does not have comprehensive knowledge of the 
system of interest – The team MUST know the system of interest:  its 
function, how it operates, what’s in the systems and what’s not in the 
system, its interfaces, etc. 
• FMEA team has not been properly trained – “making it up as you 
go” is a recipe for disaster, the team must understand the intellectual 
analysis process as well as the program specific requirements 
governing classification of the analysis results. 
• FMEA team becomes bogged down in the minute details and 
loses sight of the overall objective – the objective of the FMEA 
Analysis is to identify all credible failure modes with the goal of 
eliminating when possible and providing strong retention rationale 
when not possible 
• FMEA team rushes through the process to “get on with” the 
design and building – FMEA takes a great deal of time to complete.  
It essentially the “pay me now or pay me later” concept.  Time spent up 
front identifying ways to eliminate the failure modes or manage the 
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effects has a very high return on investment if you avoid catastrophic 
or critical events in the future.  If the team rushes through the process 
they could miss significant but obscure failure modes. 
• Too general – FMEA team lists the same failure condition for every 
failure mode or lists a failure mode that is too generic e.g. fails to 
function.  If all of the results are the same then the product is 
meaningless. 
• FMEA is started late in the design process – if the FMEA Analysis is 
started after it is too late affect the design early in the process, then the 
“pay me now or pay me later” concept applies. 
• Management does not allow enough time – this could be because 
they do not understand what it takes to complete the process or they 
do not understand the value of the results or it could be that designing 
and building hardware seems more productive than analyzing 
hardware. 
THE ANALYSIS PROCESS 
Figure 1 illustrates the overall FMEA Process.  It is important to note that 
the process is iterative once your system has been defined and the cycle will 
happen multiple times in the overall project life cycle.  As the design becomes 




Figure 1 – The Overall FMEA Process 
Define Your System of Interest 
Before the analysis can begin, the analysis team must know what the 
system of interest is and how it works.  The team must consider all of the 
elements listed below and ensure that the entire team has a common 
understanding. 
• Description – use block diagrams and other models. 
• Boundaries – where the system begins and ends is very important as 
you consider the effects of the failures. 
• Interfaces – you need to know all of your interfaces to ensure that you 
understand how failures in your system could affect other systems. 
• Functions – how your system works and what it is supposed to do. 
• Ground Rules and Assumptions – document any assumptions and 
























Identify Failure Modes 
Once the team understands how the system should work, they need to 
identify ALL credible failure modes.  As a starting point, the analysis team should 
consider the following basic failure conditions: 
• Premature operation 
• Failure to operate within specification or at a prescribed time 
• Intermittent operation 
• Failure during operation, including failure to contain or store energy 
or fluids 
• Failure to cease operation at a prescribed time 
• Degraded output or operational capability 
There are other sources to assist in the identification of failure modes: 
• Actual operational failure history of identical or similar items 
• Actual developmental/testing failure history of the hardware or 
similar items 
• Published sources of historical failure mode data 
• Generic Failure modes 
• Released and controlled component, assembly, detailed 
engineering drawings and specifications 
• Training aids, such as cross-section drawings, photographs, and 
exploded assembly drawings 
• Engineering knowledge. 
Identify Causes 
For each postulated failure mode, the analysis team must identify potential 
failure causes.  Failure causes are the physical or chemical processes, design 
defects, quality defects, part misapplication, or other processes which are the 
basic reasons for failure or which initiate the physical process by which 
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deterioration proceeds to failure.6  Good sources of failure causes are:  heritage 
system failure history, generic failure causes, and engineering 
knowledge/experience and judgment.  The major programs at the Johnson 
Space Center provided suggested failure causes in their program requirements 
and processes. 
Develop Mitigation Options 
Once all of the causes have been identified, the team needs to think about 
how to ensure that the system will work.  The team needs to identify mitigation 
options to address each of the causes that were identified.  The first goal should 
be to eliminate the cause.  If the cause cannot be eliminated by design, the team 
should identify features of the design that will reduce the likelihood of the cause 
occurring through design features, manufacturing controls, process controls, 
tests, or inspections.  Design features can be:  material selection, parts derating, 
parts selection, or application of industry standards for strength, sizing, derating, 
etc.  Some engineers will try to use redundancy as a mitigation option, but 
remember you are trying to eliminate or reduce the chances of the cause 
occurring and manifesting itself in a failure mode.  While redundancy will 
eliminate single point failures, redundancy only addresses the effect of the failure 
mode occurring, so redundancy may not be a valid mitigation option to eliminate 
the cause, however, you may consider redundancy when addressing how to 
mitigate the effects of the failure mode.  There are many standards that have 
been developed documenting “best practices” to assist in the process of 
mitigating causes. 
                                            
6 Department of Defense.  MIL-STD-1629A Procedures for Performing a Failure Mode 




Part two of this step is defining how to deal with the failure if it does occur.  
If, despite all of the great things that were done to reduce the likelihood of the 
causes; the failure occurs, what can be done?  In other words, what actions are 
available to negate or mitigate the effect of a failure on a system, these actions 
are called compensating provisions. 
• Define fault detection methods – becomes a design requirement – 
how can the failure be detected? 
• Define fault isolation methods – may become a design requirement 
– how can the failure be isolated? 
• Define fault recovery methods, including ground and/or crew 
actions – becomes an operational requirement – The team must 
identify compensating provisions (e.g. redundancies and other 
protective features that can regain the original function or protect 
from the effects of the failure.   
Identify and Classify Effects 
Identify the effects on all functions and operations.  There are probably 
multiple effects including the worst case doomsday effect which is most likely 
different from the effect that has the highest probability of occurrence.  The team 
must describe the credible failure effects at the following levels: 
• Immediate Effect – the failure effect on the item under analysis, the 
assembly it is associated with (if appropriate), and its interfaces 
• Next Effect – the failure effects at the next higher assembly level, 
typically the subsystem/system 
• End Effect – The failure effects at the integrated vehicle level, 
including the effects on the mission and the crew 
The team then estimates the time from failure occurrence to the 
manifestation of the worst case effect.  The standard time categories are: 
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• Immediate – less than 1 second 
• Seconds – 1 to 60 seconds 
• Minutes – 60 seconds to 60 minutes 
• Hours – 60 minutes to 24 hours 
• Days – 24 hours to mission complete 
In order to assist the program/project manager in understanding the 
severity of the failure modes, classify the effects of the failure modes.  Typically 
each program or project will tailor the definitions of severity classification (e.g. 
criticality) to suit their individual needs but the standard categories from MIL-
STD-1629A Procedures for Performing a Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality 
Analysis are:   
• Category I – Catastrophic – A failure which may cause death or 
weapon system loss (i.e. aircraft, tank, missile, ship, etc.) 
• Category II – Critical – A failure which may cause severe injury, 
major property damage, or major system damage which will result 
in mission loss. 
• Category III – Marginal – A failure which may cause minor injury, 
minor property damage, or minor system damage which will result 
in delay or loss of availability or mission degradation. 
• Category IV – Minor – A failure not serious enough to cause injury, 
property damage, or system damage, but will result in unscheduled 
maintenance or repair.7 
                                            
7 Department of Defense.  MIL-STD-1629A Procedures for Performing a Failure Mode 




Identify Critical Items and Develop Retention Rationale 
Once the severity of each of the failure modes has been identified, the 
critical items can be identified.  Each program or project will have their own 
definitions of critical items but they will typically include catastrophic and critical 
failure modes.  Since it is highly improbable that you will be able to “design out” 
all of the catastrophic and critical failure modes, you will need to provide other 
options that can be accomplished to reduce the likelihood of the failure occurring 
or how you can reduce the effects of the failure.  Again programs or projects will 
tailor what is required to document rationale for acceptance but the following 
categories are generally accepted and will be leveraged from your 
“recommended options” activities from the “Develop Mitigation Options” step in 
the process: 
• Design – identify specific design features that will minimize the 
probability of occurrence of the failure mode.  Examples include – 
increased factors of safety, material selection, addition of 
redundancy;  
• Test – identify specific tests performed during manufacturing, 
hardware acceptance, system integration or ground processing that 
would detect the presence of the critical failure cause that would 
not be compromised by later processing activities.  Examples 
include:  test procedures, ground checkout, preflight checkout; 
• Inspection - identify specific inspections performed during 
manufacturing, hardware acceptance, system integration or ground 
processing that would detect the presence of the critical failure 
cause that would not be compromised by later processing activities.   




• Operational Use – describe the operational techniques that could 
be used to mitigate the effects of the failure once it has occurred 
such as operator actions to circumvent or mitigate the effect of the 
postulated failure; 
• Failure History – Include all failure history for failure mode listed for 
this particular design or a similar design.  This information ties the 
FMEA process to the problem reporting process in Quality 
Assurance – when failures occur, the retention rationale should be 
reviewed as part of the approval process to ensure that no failure 
modes or effects have been overlooked. 
The retention rationale discussed above is important to the program or 
project so that they know that appropriate steps have been taken to minimize the 
risk of failures. 
Generate Reports 
This is the final step in the process and the format of the reports can be as 
simple as a spreadsheet documenting the analysis results to the volumes of 
information captured for manned space programs.  Each program or project will 
set the requirements for the documentation required.  It should be noted that the 
FMEA reports should be updated as new information is realized during the 
design process.  Typical elements of FMEA reports are: 
• Scope of analysis – what’s in and what’s out – the system 
definition; 
• System description – to the level required for management to 
understand your results; 
• Failure modes, causes, criticality assignment, retention rationale; 
• Supporting data – “In God we trust, all others bring data”; 
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• Executive summary – the bottom line for management – what’s 
critical and why it is acceptable to fly with the potential failure 
modes? 
The reports are very important first they serve as documentation for 
management of the residual risk for the program or project and second they are 
an important historical reference for knowledge capture for programs with long 
lifetimes or for future programs wanting to take advantage of successful designs.  
BENEFITS OF FMEA 
FMEA Analysis results in the identification of critical items and their 
associated rationale for decision making purposes.  When done with discipline 
and rigor FMEA Analysis will: 
• Improve the quality, reliability and safety of a product/process  
• Improve company image and competitiveness  
• Increase user satisfaction  
• Reduce system development timing and cost  
• Collect information to reduce future failures, capture engineering 
knowledge  
• Reduce the potential for warranty concerns  
• Allow for early identification and elimination of potential failure 
modes  
• Emphasize problem prevention  
• Minimize late changes and associated cost  
• Serve as a catalyst for teamwork and idea exchange between 
functions  
FMEA Analysis is a structured intellectual process that will identify all 
credible failure modes, eliminate failure modes by design (where possible), 
manage the remaining failure modes and their causes, and quantify risk based 
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on severity classification. FMEA Analysis is not an exact science it relies on 
engineering expertise and sound engineering judgment and knowledge of 
product reliability principles.  FMEA Analysis also requires a systems engineering 
approach to generate the retention rationale.  It is also an important tool in the 




Chapter 3:  Hazard Analysis 
WHAT IS HAZARD ANALYSIS? 
MIL-STD-882D Standard Practice for System Safety defines a Hazard as 
“any real or potential condition that can cause injury, illness, or death to 
personnel; damage to or loss of a system, equipment or property; or damage to 
the environment” and a Hazardous Material as “any substance that, due to its 
chemical, physical, or biological nature, causes safety, public health, or 
environmental concerns that would require an elevated level of effort to 
manage.”8  Hazard Analysis starts with identifying the conditions or materials that 
exist that have the potential to cause harm resulting in a mishap and then 
working to determine how to control the hazards or materials.  It is important to 
note that hazards or hazardous materials do not always result in mishaps.  
Proper controls are put in place to ensure that undesired events do not occur in 
the presence of hazards or hazardous materials. 
Figure 2 depicts how Hazard Analysis should precede an approved 
design.  As the Hazard Analysis is completed, it will show how to bring the risk 
down to a level accepted by the program or project and then the design team can 
incorporate the required features in the final design.   
 
                                            
8 Department of Defense.  MIL-STD-882D Standard Practice for System Safety.  




Figure 2 – Hazard Analysis in the Systems Engineering Process 
Hazard Analysis is a top down structured intellectual process to review a 
system looking for conditions that if left unmitigated will result in a harmful effect 
and to identify features to mitigate those conditions.   
HISTORY OF HAZARD ANALYSIS AT NASA 
The initial reliability and quality assurance requirements for the Apollo 
program did not include any discussion of Hazard Analysis.9  Hazard Analysis 
was not a key part of manned spaceflight until after the Apollo 1 fire on the pad.10  
Prior to that incident, the only “flight safety” that was considered was closely 
related to what the Occupational Safety and Health Administration evaluates 
                                            
9 Levine, Joe, Marion Merrell and Jeff Adams. JSC SR&QA Evolution Resulting from 
Manned Spacecraft Program History. Working Paper. 2002. 6. Print. 










today, e.g. facility safety, slips, trips, and falls.11  After the Apollo 1 fire on the 
launch pad, Boeing was tasked to perform independent analyses to review the 
overall safety, reliability and hazard assessments.  This was the beginning of 
Hazardous Operations Analyses at NASA pushed primarily by the accident 
investigation and reconstruction boards and panels.  NASA wanted to learn from 
their mistakes and install more pre-analyses and rigor in their design, 
development and operational systems.  This effort resulted in more extensive 
Safety Analyses Reports and Critical Process Reviews and the identification of 
the controls and mitigation techniques that were added to program 
documentation.12   
OBSTACLES IN THE HAZARD ANALYSIS PROCESS  
Sometimes programs or projects get overwhelmed by the Hazard Analysis 
process because it breaks down and can easily become time consuming by 
letting the task of producing the Hazard Report become the goal rather than 
doing the analysis and updating the system design or implementing controls to 
increase safety.  The Hazard Analysis process needs to start early in the life 
cycle, as early as the conceptual phase, with proper management support to gain 
the full benefit of the analysis.  Like FMEA Analysis there can be obstacles in the 
process: 
 Not starting the process in the early conceptual phase of the project 
 Not fully understanding the system design and operation 
 Skipping ahead in the process and jumping to a design solution. 
                                            
11 Levine, Joe. Personal Interview. 19 November 2008. 




THE ANALYSIS PROCESS 
Define Your System of Interest 
Before you can begin your analysis you need to know what your system of 
interest is and how it works.  Consider all of the elements listed below and 
ensure that the entire team has a common understanding. 
• Description – use block diagrams and other models. 
• Boundaries – where the system begins and ends is very important as 
you consider the effects of the failures. 
• Interfaces – you need to know all of your interfaces to ensure that you 
understand how failures in your system could affect other systems. 
• Functions – how your system works and what it is supposed to do. 
• Ground Rules and Assumptions – document any assumptions and 
ground rules that the team has agreed to. 
Identify Hazardous Conditions 
This should be a brainstorming exercise of discovery with your team 
members relying heavily on your engineering training and experience along with 
the knowledge of the operation of your system.  Ask the question “What is 
inherently dangerous about the operation of your system?”  Use generic hazard 
lists, hazard reports from heritage or legacy systems, lessons learned, and failure 
histories.  You need to be sure to consider hazards that you could cause on 
interfacing systems and hazards from them that could impact your system.  This 
step is where people often confuse hazardous conditions with the hazardous 
state.  Hazardous conditions alone do not result in mishaps or catastrophic 
events; it takes an initiating event to turn a hazardous condition into a bad day.  
Table 1 shows examples of hazards, possible initiating events and potential 
undesired events.   
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Table 1 – Examples of Hazardous Conditions 
Hazardous Condition Initiating Event Undesired Event 
Flammable Liquids Ignition Source e.g. spark Explosion 
Hot Surface Human error Burn 
Pressurized Container Rupture Explosion 
Lasers Pointing error Blindness 
High Voltage Human error Shock 
Two Spacecraft in 
Proximity Operations 
Failure in attitude control 
system 
Collision 
RF Transmission Pointing error Exposure to radiation 
Radioactive Materials 
Compromise of storage 
container 
Exposure to radiation 
Identify the Effect of the Hazardous State 
Given the hazardous condition, postulate all of the undesired events that 
could happen given the potential to cause harm of the hazard.  Identify 
unplanned events that could result in death, injury, occupational illness, damage 
to or loss of equipment or property or damage to the environment.  At this point in 
the analysis do not consider or eliminate effects based on presumed likelihood of 
occurrence, all credible effects must be evaluated. 
Identify the Severity of the Effect 
Once the effects are identified, using guidelines established by the project 
categorize the severity of the effects of the mishap.  The standard categories 
from MIL-STD-882D Standard Practice for System Safety are:   
• Catastrophic – Could result in death, permanent total disability, loss 
exceeding $1M, or irreversible severe environmental damage that 
violates law or regulation. 
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• Critical – Could result in permanent partial disability, injuries or 
occupational illness that may result in hospitalization of at least 
three personnel, loss exceeding $200K but less than $1M, or 
reversible environmental damage causing a violation of law or 
regulation. 
• Marginal – Could result in injury or occupational illness resulting in 
one or more lost work day(s), loss exceeding $10K but less than 
$200K, or mitigatable environmental damage without violation of 
law or regulation where restoration activities can be accomplished. 
• Negligible – Could result in injury or illness not resulting in a lost 
work day, loss exceeding $2K but less than $10K, or minimal 
environmental damage not violating law or regulation.13 
Identify all Potential Causes of the Hazardous States 
This step can rely on many different analysis techniques including FMEA 
Analysis or Fault Tree Analysis to identify all of the possible initiating events that 
can turn a hazardous condition into a mishap or catastrophic failure.  The 
analysis team needs to identify all unsafe acts or conditions that could lead to the 
hazardous event.  The causes need to be indentified down to the level of the 
system at which the controls are to be applied.  When looking for causes, the 
team should consider environmental conditions, hardware failures, software 
errors, procedural errors, personnel action or inaction, and component 
interactions (e.g. sneak circuits). 
                                            
13 Department of Defense.  MIL-STD-882D Standard Practice for System Safety.  




Identify Controls for each of the Hazard Causes 
The dream of any program or project manager would be to field a hazard 
free system.  Given the nature of most complex systems, it would be impossible 
or impractical to achieve this goal.  There is residual risk with any space system; 
to minimize this risk the hazard causes must be controlled.  Regardless of the 
program that you are working in, there is an accepted order of precedence to 
reduce the risk of the operation of the system.  The first line of defense should 
always be changing the design to eliminate or minimize the effects of the 
hazardous condition.  The system safety design order of precedence is: 
• Eliminate hazards through design selection.  If unable to eliminate 
an identified hazard, reduce the associated mishap risk to an 
acceptable level through design selection. 
• Incorporate safety devices.  If unable to eliminate the hazard 
through design selection, reduce the mishap to an acceptable leve 
using protective safety features or devices. 
• Provide warning devices.  If safety devices do not adequately lower 
the mishap risk of the hazard, include a detection and warning 
system to alert personnel to the particular hazard. 
• Develop procedures and training.  Where it is impractical to 
eliminate hazards through design selection or to reduce the 
associated risk to an acceptable level with safety and warning 
devices, incorporate special procedures and training. Procedures 
may include the use of personal protective equipment. For hazards 
assigned Catastrophic or Critical mishap severity categories, avoid 
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using warning, caution, or other written advisory as the only risk 
reduction method.14 
Identify the Likelihood of Each Cause 
For this step in the analysis process, the team should assume that the 
controls have been implemented.  Now evaluate the likelihood that the undesired 
event will occur.  This is a qualitative assessment performed to determine the 
likelihood of the worst case effects of the hazard being manifested.  The team 
should consider the following when determining the likelihood:  previous failure 
history, heritage systems, reliability assessments, strength of the controls.  
Again, each program or project may define their own likelihood categories. The 
standard categories from MIL-STD-882D Standard Practice for System Safety 
are: 
• Frequent – Likely to occur often in the life of an item with a 
probability of occurrence greater than 10-1 in that life. 
• Probable – Will occur several times in the life of an item with the 
probability of occurrence of less than 10-1 but greater than 10-2 in 
that life. 
• Occasional – Likely to occur sometime in the life of an item with the 
probability of occurrence of less than 10-2 but greater than 10-3 in 
that life. 
                                            
14 Department of Defense.  MIL-STD-882D Standard Practice for System Safety.  





• Remote – Unlikely but possible to occur in the life of an item with 
the probability of occurrence of less than 10-3 but greater than 10-6 
in that life. 
• Improbable – So unlikely, it can be assumed occurrence may not 
be experienced, with a probability of occurrence of less than 10-6 in 
that life.15 
Indentify Verification Strategies for the Controls 
The verification strategies define how you will know that the controls are in 
place and are identical to the standard requirements verification methods that 
systems engineers are familiar with:  test, analysis, demonstration and 
inspection.  Once strategies are identified, a closed loop tracking system is used 
to track the verification to completion.   
Track Verification to Closure 
Hazard Analysis is an iterative process and should continue through 
system delivery.  As the defined controls are identified they should be provided to 
the requirements team and the design team depending on the life cycle phase.  
As the requirements and the design change you may need to revisit the hazard 
analysis. 
Generate Reports 
This is the final step in the process and the format of the reports can be as 
simple as a spreadsheet documenting the analysis results to the volumes of 
                                            
15 Department of Defense.  MIL-STD-882D Standard Practice for System Safety.  





information captured for manned space programs.  Each program or project will 
set the requirements for the documentation required.  It should be noted that the 
Hazard reports should be updated as new information is realized during the 
design process.  Typical elements of Hazard reports are: 
• Scope of analysis – what’s in and what’s out – the system 
definition; 
• System description – to the level required for management to 
understand your results; 
• Hazard, effects, severity, causes, controls, likelihood, verification 
strategy; 
• Supporting data – “In God we trust, all others bring data”; 
• Executive summary – the bottom line for management – what’s 
critical and why it is acceptable to fly with the potential failure 
modes? 
The reports are very important first they serve as documentation for 
management of the residual risk for the program or project and second they are 
an important historical reference for knowledge capture for programs with long 
lifetimes or for future programs wanting to take advantage of successful designs.  
BENEFITS OF HAZARD ANALYSIS 
Hazard analysis results in the identification of risks and the means of 
controlling or eliminating them.  Hazard analysis also quantifies the risk for the 
Program/Project Manager.  Properly incorporated in the design and development 
of a system the results of Hazard Analysis will ensure that the system is safer.  
Hazard Analysis results in the identification of risks and the means of controlling 




Chapter 4:  Compare/Contrast FMEA Analysis and Hazard 
Analysis   
So far, this paper has discussed the FMEA Analysis and Hazard Analysis 
processes.  There are similarities in the processes; however there are important 
differences in the benefits.   
 
 
Figure 3 – Comparison of FMEA Analysis and Hazard Analysis 
SIMILARITIES 
Figure 3 shows similarities of the outputs for FMEA Analysis and Hazard 















Bottoms Up: FMEA Analysis
Top Down: Hazard Analysis
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 Failure modes may show up as initiating events in Hazard Analysis 
when FMEA Analysis is used to identify causes of mishaps. 
 Effects for both techniques describe the undesired event. 
 Criticality in FMEA Analysis is like the severity defined in Hazard 
analysis.  Both attributes classify the failure mode or hazard by the 
criticality or severity of the effects.  These classifications allow the 
project team to concentrate the most resources on the most critical 
or most severe items. 
 Mitigating Options/Compensating Provisions for FMEA Analysis 
look much like the Controls from Hazard Analysis.  Both items show 
the project how the engineering team has taken action to reduce 
the likelihood of the undesired effect from occurring or defined 
actions that can be taken to lessen the severity of the effects if the 
failure occurs or the hazardous condition is initiated. 
DIFFERENCES 
Although there are similarities, there ARE major differences.   
 Failure modes of a system that are identified in FMEA Analysis will 
not encompass all of the initiating events identified by Hazard 
Analysis that could trigger an undesired event.  And conversely the 
initiating events identified by Hazard Analysis will not identify all of 
the failure modes postulated during FMEA Analysis. 
 FMEA Analysis is a bottoms up analytical process that starts at the 
component or subassembly level of a system, postulates all of the 
ways that the component or subassembly could fail and then 
identifies the effects of those failures.  Hazard Analysis is a top 
down process that starts with the question “what is inherently 
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dangerous about my system?” and then seeks to identify all of the 
initiating events that could trigger mishaps.  For example, when 
performing Hazard Analysis on an auxiliary power unit (APU) the 
analysis team would consider the hazardous condition of the 
pressurized volume and an initiating event of a rupture resulting in 
an explosion.  They would put appropriate controls in place to 
minimize the risk of the explosion.  The Hazard Analysis would not 
consider hardware failures resulting in loss of function of the APU, 
whereas FMEA Analysis would.  If the analysis team only considers 
hazardous events such as explosion, they would miss failure 
modes such as failed closed valves resulting in loss of the APU 
function. 
 FMEA Analysis does not consider human error in the analysis it 
only considers how the system can fail whereas Hazard Analysis 
considers human error, failures, and environmental conditions as 
initiating events for the mishaps. 
 Hazard Analysis controls typically include things like fault tolerance, 
factors of safety, and operational workarounds to minimize the 
effects of the undesired condition.  FMEA Analysis delves deeper 
into material compatibility, parts selection, specific screening tests 
and inspections to control the failure mode causes.  
The implementation of the results of FMEA Analysis will ensure that the 
system will perform reliably and the implementation of the results of Hazard 





Chapter 5:  Myths about FMEA Analysis and Hazard 
Analysis 
There are many myths about FMEA Analysis and Hazard Analysis.  Most 
of the confusion is due to lack of understanding of the process and benefits of the 
products of the two analysis techniques.   
MYTH #1:  FMEA AND HAZARD ANALYSIS REPORTS ARE NOT USED OVER THE 
LIFE OF THE PROJECT 
Some systems engineers in the unmanned world of NASA have the idea 
FMEA Analysis and Hazard Analysis are not useful after the early milestones in 
the project life cycle.  Some even see the products from the two analysis 
techniques simply as deliverables listed on the contract data requirements list 
and once they are delivered they have “checked the box” and can move on to the 
other parts of the system design.  This thinking is erroneous and short sighted 
and leads to missed opportunities in the areas of cost savings, reduced 
efficiency, and schedule risk of finding disconnects later in the life cycle.  That is 
unfortunate since there is so much valuable information that can be gleaned from 
the results of the two analysis techniques.  When done properly, the system can 
benefit via improved requirements, design, tests, inspections, and special 
procedure or workarounds.  The resulting reports should be put under 
configuration management and tracked to ensure that the improvements are 
carried out in the final design, verification and use of the system.   
Using FMEA Analysis Results 
The mitigation options and compensating provisions from FMEA Analysis 
should be used as follows: 
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 Design – there should be ample opportunity to influence the design 
to either eliminate the cause of the failure mode or to reduce the 
likelihood that the failure will occur due to the causes identified.  
The design features identified in the FMEA Reports need to be 
tracked through the design review milestones to ensure that the 
recommended design changes were implemented.   
 Test – during the analysis specific tests were identified to detect the 
presence of the specific causes and failure modes identified.  As 
the verification methods are developed, there needs to be 
assurance that these tests have been incorporated in the 
acceptance of the system prior to first use to ensure that the failure 
cause doesn’t exist.  These tests can be part of the design 
qualification tests, tests during the assembly and integration 
process, or they could be final tests prior to first use.   
 Inspection – The same thing applies for inspection as for tests.  If 
the analysis identified ways to inspect for the failure cause, there 
needs to be assurance that these inspections made their way into 
the manufacturing process.  
 Mitigating Options and Compensating Provisions – The special 
operational techniques that were identified in the analysis process 
need to be added to flight rules, operating procedures, or special 
training to ensure that if the failure does occur, the process is in 
place to circumvent or mitigate the effects of the failure.   
Using Hazard Analysis Results 
The controls from the Hazard Analysis should be used as follows: 
 Design – the results of the hazard analysis can also influence the 
design and should be tracked through the design reviews. 
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 Safety Devices – there needs to be verification that any safety 
devices that were identified in the analysis process have been 
implemented in the design and should be tracked through the 
design reviews. 
 Caution and Warning – there needs to be verification that any 
caution and warning devices such as warning lights or claxons that 
were identified in the analysis process have been implemented in 
the design and should be tracked through the design reviews.  In 
addition to hardware caution and warning; warnings and cautionary 
notes, labels or marking should be provided for assembly, 
operation and maintenance activities. 
 Special Procedures – there needs to be verification that any special 
procedures that were identified in the analysis process have been 
implemented in the appropriate assembly, operation and 
maintenance procedures. 
The bottom line is that all of the results from the two analysis techniques 
need to be incorporated in the overall systems engineering process over the 
entire life cycle to ensure that the final system is both safe and reliable. 
MYTH #2:  YOU DON’T NEED TO DO BOTH FMEA AND HAZARD ANALYSIS  
As discussed in Chapter 4, the similarities between FMEA Analysis and 
Hazard Analysis have led some to say that you get everything you need with only 
one of the analysis techniques and perhaps they could save project resources by 
eliminating the requirement to perform one of the processes.  There is also 
confusion since FMEA Analysis is sometimes used in Hazard Analysis to help 
identify initiating events that result in mishaps.  The FMEA Analysis done in direct 
support of Hazard Analysis is only looking at failure modes that would serve as 
initiating events for that particular hazardous condition and should not be 
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considered the all inclusive analysis for a particular system.  If FMEA Analysis is 
eliminated, Hazard Analysis will result in a classification of how critical the 
undesired event is, you get a likelihood of the undesired event occurring and you 
get a list of methods to control or deal with the undesired event.  However, you 
may miss critical failure modes or critical hazards if both analyses are not 
performed.  Consider the following examples: 
FMEA Analysis Will Miss a Critical Hazard 
The Ku-Band Radar and Communications System onboard the Space 
Shuttle Orbiter consists of three avionics boxes and an antenna assembly (called 
the Deployed Assembly) mounted in the payload bay shown in Figure 4. The 
Deployed Assembly has gimbal motors that by the nature of their design are not 
explosion proof, in other words they can act as an ignition source in a volatile 
environment.     
 
Figure 4 – The Ku-Band Deployed Assembly on the Space Shuttle Discovery inside the Orbiter 
Processing Facility Bay 3 at NASA's Kennedy Space Center, Credit:  NASA. 
FMEA Analysis was performed to identify the ways that the motors could 
fail and there are FMEA reports documenting failure modes result in losing the 




Band System and on the overall Shuttle mission.  However, the FMEA Analysis 
does not address what would happen if the system was operated in a volatile 
environment.  That situation was addressed when the engineering team asked 
the question, “What is inherently dangerous about the operation of the system?”  
The gimbal motors were identified as the hazard.  There are operations as the 
Orbiter is being processed at the Kennedy Space Center where volatile gases 
could be present.  That would be the initiating event and the worst case effect 
would be an explosion if the Ku-Band System was operated in that environment.  
So controls were put in place for operations with the Orbiter that doesn’t allow the 
Ku-Band to be operated when there are volatile gases present in the facility and 
vice versa.  To date there have been no incidents of explosions in the processing 
facility related to the Ku-Band System gimbal motors.  Without the Hazard 
Analysis, this hazard may have been overlooked until a mishap occurred. 
Hazard Analysis Will Not Identify All Failure Modes  
Since Hazard Analysis asked what is dangerous about operating a 
system, it has the potential to overlook failure modes that do not manifest as 
mishaps.  Yet, the effects of these other failure modes are very important for 
mission success.  Again looking at the Ku-Band Radar and Communication 
System on the Space Shuttle Orbiter, the Ku-Band System provides a critical 
service to the overall success of a Space Shuttle mission.  It provides downlink of 
high rate data from payloads on the Orbiter and downlink of live television.  The 
Ku-Band System is a complicated system with many electrical and mechanical 
parts with many potential failure modes any one of which could result in the loss 
of the high rate downlink function.  Loss of this function is not inherently 
dangerous to the Space Shuttle mission so many of these failure modes would 
not be addressed with the proper controls through Hazard Analysis.  Without 
FMEA Analysis to identify the many failure modes and address the causes 
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through improvements in design, test and inspection; the reliability of the Ku-
Band System would be much less than it is today.   
MYTH #4:  FMEA ANALYSIS WON’T TELL ME ANYTHING THAT I DON’T 
ALREADY KNOW 
Some design engineers feel that they know more about their system than 
their reliability counterparts.  While that may be true, there is opportunity to 
improve system designs when all of the possible failure mechanisms that may 
cause the system to fail.  The design engineers may not be aware of all of the 
options available to improve the reliability of their design such as parts selection,  
Some systems engineers feel that they know where all of the single point failures 
that would kill their mission so, they do not need to do FMEA Analysis.  If a 
system has single failure points, there is a stronger need to perform the analysis 
to identify design solutions to eliminate or mitigate failure mode causes to control.  
Either way, to ensure the most reliable system design, a multi-disciplined team is 
required to ensure that all likely failure modes and their probable effects are 
identified and dealt with properly.      
MYTH #5:  FMEA ANALYSIS WON’T DISCOVER EFFECTS ON THE END ITEM 
The Goddard Spaceflight Center is currently developing the four 
spacecraft for the Magnetospheric Multiscale (MMS) mission.  The MMS mission 
is a Solar-Terrestrial Probe mission comprising four identically instrumented 
spacecraft that will use the Earth’s magnetosphere as a laboratory to study 
magnetic reconnection.  As shown in Figure 5, there are four 58 meter wire 
booms to measure electrical fields attached to each of the four spacecraft.  As 
with most spacecraft there is a propulsion system responsible for providing an 




Figure 5 – Artist conception of the four MMS spacecraft.  Credit:  Southwest Research Institute.16 
Consider the FMEA Analysis that would be performed on a thruster in the 
propulsion system on the spacecraft.  It was surmised that the engineer 
performing the FMEA Analysis on the thruster would not know all the effects of a 
failure of the thruster would be on the spacecraft and its overall mission, 
including that exciting the wire booms such that they could be wrapped around 
the spacecraft or other rigid booms.  This is where it is important to note the 
FMEA Analysis should not be an individual sport.  It should be a team sport with 
the correct skill mix and systems knowledge to ask the right questions.  For 
example, back to the potential failure of a thruster on one of the MMS spacecraft.  
                                            
16 Hendrix, Susan. "NASA's Magnetospheric Mission Passes Major Milestone." The 





One of the failure modes of a thruster is that it inadvertently provides thrust.  
Following the FMEA Analysis process discussed in Chapter 2, look at effects at 
all levels up to and including effects on the spacecraft.  Consider the following 
questions that the analysis should address when determining the effects of an 
inadvertent thruster firing: 
 What happens to the spacecraft?  The spacecraft could be sent off 
course or start to rotate in an undesirable state. 
 What happens to all of the booms attached to the spacecraft if it 
begins to rotate in an undesirable state?  The physical 
characteristics of each of the booms and their relationship to each 
other would have to be evaluated by a team of experts to determine 
if any undesired interactions between the booms would occur due 
to the unplanned motion of the spacecraft.  
If the team of engineers followed the prescribed FMEA Analysis 
methodology and asked the right questions and considered the effects on the 
whole spacecraft, these critical effects will be identified early in the design 
process and assurances put in place to ensure proper operation of the thrusters 
to minimize the likelihood of compromising a mission due to a failed thruster.  
When executed properly FMEA Analysis will identify effects of failed components 







Chapter 6:  Benefits to Program Management  
The goal of every program or project manager is to have a safe reliable 
product and to have an understanding of the residual risk of operating that 
product.  In order to accomplish that goal the manager relies on his systems 
engineering team to design the best system to meet the mission objectives.  
FMEA Analysis and Hazard Analysis are two of the very important tools that can 
be used to meet that goal.   
The greatest criticism of FMEA Analysis has been its limited use in 
improving system designs.  The chief causes for this are that the FMEA Analysis 
is not performed early enough in the design process and the performance of the 
analysis has been isolated from the design process.17  If the Reliability engineers 
worked together with the design and systems engineers then the FMEA Analysis 
would be more comprehensive and value added changes to the design could be 
made early in the design process.   Therefore, FMEA Analysis should be initiated 
as soon as preliminary design information is available at the higher system levels 
and extended to the lower levels as more information becomes available on the 
items in question. 
FMEA Analysis results in the identification of critical items and their 
associated retention rationale for decision making purposes.  FMEA Analysis will 
define design options to eliminate the failure cause, improve system reliability to 
minimize failure likelihood, or reduce the severity of the effect if the failure does 
occur.   It will also define methods for fault detection and recovery including 
                                            
17 Department of Defense.  MIL-STD-1629A Procedures for Performing a Failure Mode 





inspection points, tests, telemetry, or operational workarounds.  The results of 
FMEA Analysis can be used by quality assurance in the planning and control of 
critical processes to ensure a reliable system.  Of most value to the program or 
project manager is the identification of critical items for use in their risk 
management. 
The results of FMEA Analysis should be considered for all life cycle 
phases of a system.  Although one of the most visible places where the FMEA 
Analysis results are used is system design; the results can also be used to 
improve maintainability, identify initiating events in Hazard Analysis, logistics 
support, maintenance plans, and for failure detection and fault isolation.  FMEA 
Analysis results can be used to improve tests to verify performance in all 
operating conditions.  For example, the FMEA Analysis for a particular infrared 
Earth sensor indicated the existence of a failure mechanism at the upper 
operating temperature which would only be detectable if the infrared sensor was 
stimulated by an infrared source at that temperature.  Unfortunately the FMEA 
was not used during the preparation of the test procedure, the sensor was not 
stimulated during thermal testing and a fault occurred in orbit.  A $100 million 
project was thus unnecessarily jeopardized.18 
Hazard Analysis provides assurance to the project that the design is safe 
as possible, that the requirements address hazard mitigation and that the risk is 
properly identified.  Hazard Analysis is used as a design tool influencing the 
design to reduce if not eliminate hazardous conditions.  The results of the Hazard 
Analysis can also be used to assist in validation of the system requirements.  
Incorporating the controls into the system requirements will help to ensure that 
                                            
18 Fortescue, Peter W., John Stark, and Graham Swinerd. Spacecraft Systems 




the requirements are complete ensuring that the project will “build the right thing”.  
After all of the Hazard Analysis is complete, the main value to the project will be 
as a risk assessment and risk management tool.  While in some cases safety risk 
can be eliminated, in most cases a certain degree of safety risk must be 
accepted.  In order to quantify expected accident costs before the fact, the 
potential consequences of an accident, and the probability of occurrence must be 
considered.  The summary of the hazard analysis results in an overall relative 
risk ranking for the project/program to identify where the greatest resources 
should be applied toward risk reduction.  The safest thing to do is to never fly; in 
order to fly you must accept a certain level of risk.  The results of the Hazard 
Analysis quantify that risk so that it can be managed.   
The results of FMEA Analysis and Hazard Analysis are also important in 
the overall risk management of a program or project.  Once the criticality of the 
failure modes and the severity of the hazards have been identified, the program 
or project manager can concentrate their resources on the most critical and most 
severe items; thus focusing their efforts to get the best return on their resource 




Chapter 7:  Integrating Analysis Results into the Systems 
Engineering Process 
As discussed before, books and reference materials on Systems 
Engineering do discuss safety and reliability usually as a specialty engineering 
discipline to supplement the overall systems engineering process.  It should be 
noted that in order to get the best system possible, safety and reliability need to 
be integrated into the whole process from the conceptual stages of a project 
through operations and disposal.  The consideration of failure potential, or 
mission risk, of a system is an essential part of systems engineering.  In order to 
ensure that a reliable and safe system is designed, it is important to understand 
the failures that will impact mission success and the hazards that will result in 
mishaps and take appropriate actions to eliminate or mitigate the causes.   
FMEA Analysis and Hazard Analysis must be part of the overall systems 
engineering process over the entire life cycle of the project and should not be 
considered tasks that are completed to “check the box” to meet a contract 
deliverable and put the reports on a shelf.  The results of both analyses need to 
be used as discussed to improve the overall mission success and safety of the 
system.  There are two “sides” to integrating these processes into the systems 
engineering process.  First is the technical side and how the processes fit into the 
system life cycle.  Second is the overcoming the obstacles to and myths 
surrounding the FMEA and Hazard Analysis processes.  
Integrating FMEA and Hazard Analyses into the Systems Engineering 
Process 
Table 2 shows where FMEA and Hazard Analysis fit into the overall 
system life cycle and how the results are used to improve the safety and 




Table 2 – FMEA Analysis and Hazard Analysis throughout the System Life Cycle 
 
During the conceptual development phase of the project, hazard analysis 
identifies inherently hazardous design and operational characteristics.  Thought 
is also given to the preliminary severity of the potential hazards to ensure that 
proper safety requirements are documented in the System Requirements 
Document.  Preliminary FMEA Analysis is started to evaluate the functional 
criticality of the system to ensure that the proper fault tolerance requirements are 
levied in the system requirements document. 
As the system design matures to the preliminary design phase, Hazard 
Analysis can start identifying additional initiating events through fault tree and 
other related analysis techniques progress.  The FMEA Analysis can start as the 
detailed design has started.   Results of the FMEA Analysis should begin to 
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As the system passes the final design phase and begins fabrication, both 
the FMEA and Hazard Analysis should be complete and the results used to 
validate the design in accordance with the mitigation options and controls defined 
in the analysis processes.  Inspection and Test Retention Rationale from the 
FMEA Analysis should be integrated into the assembly, integration and test 
phase of the system development to ensure that failure mode causes do not exist 
in the final system. 
During the operational phase of a system, compensating provisions 
identified in the FMEA and Hazard Analyses can be used to negate or mitigate 
the effect of a failure.   
Overcoming the Obstacles and Myths 
As discussed in chapters 2 and 3, there are obstacles in performing the 
two analysis techniques.  There are also myths to overcome to reset the 
paradigm of design engineers and systems engineers as discussed in chapter 5.  
Most of these obstacles and myths can be overcome with training on how to 
perform the analysis process and a greater understanding of how the results can 
improve a program or project.  Training the entire team on the methodologies for 
FMEA Analysis and Hazard Analysis will improve the overall understanding and 
value of the results of the processes.  Program and Project Managers need to be 
trained as well; this will ensure that they understand the return on their 
investment in allocating resources to perform FMEA Analysis and Hazard 
Analysis at the appropriate times in the life cycle.  Although not the main focus of 
this paper, the need for an overall paradigm shift of how reliability and safety 
engineers are integrated into overall systems engineering team is required.  That 
shift requires a change in the way the reliability and safety engineers participate 
in the systems engineering activities. The reliability and safety engineers need to: 
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• Have a firm understanding of the FMEA Analysis and Hazard 
Analysis processes.  This includes not just being a “process 
policeman” for the two analysis processes; it includes 
understanding how the processes work and how to apply them to 
their project. 
• Understand the system that they are working with. 
• Become a GREAT reliability and/or safety engineer: 
• A GOOD reliability/safety engineer can identify what can go 
wrong. 
• A BETTER reliability/safety engineer can identify what can go 
wrong and determine how likely it is. 
• A GREAT reliability/safety engineer can identify what can go 
wrong, determine how likely it is AND tell you how to avoid it.19 
It really comes down to the old adage that you should bring solutions not 
just problems to your manager.  Anyone can be a critic; a GREAT 
reliability/safety engineer brings solutions. 
With improved training and a paradigm shift, FMEA Analysis and Hazard 
Analysis can be properly integrated into the systems engineering process and 
result in increased reliability and safety for programs and projects. 
 
                                            





 Chapter 8:  Summary 
All projects can benefit from FMEA Analysis and Hazard Analysis.  The 
results of the two analysis techniques will improve system requirements, system 
design, overall system reliability and safety.  The project will have a better 
understanding of their overall risk and how to manage it.  Since design changes 
can be implemented earlier in the project life cycle and the overall mission 
success rate will be improved, this can translate into overall cost and schedule 
savings. 
FMEA Analysis is a structured intellectual process to identify all credible 
failure modes, eliminate failure modes by design if possible, manage the 
remaining failure modes and their causes, and quantify the risk based on the 
criticality of the effects of the failure modes.  FMEA Analysis is not an exact 
science, it relies on engineering expertise and engineering judgment, relies on 
knowledge of product reliability principle and requires a systems engineering 
approach to identify the mitigation options and compensating provisions.  FMEA 
Analysis is an important tool in the overall design process and risk management 
for a system.  24.8% of the documented spacecraft failures from 1962 – 1988 
were caused by poor design.20  Incorporating a rigorous FMEA Analysis process 
will ensure that system reliability was “designed in”. 
Hazard Analysis is a structured intellectual process to identify risk, classify 
risk and manage risk.  Hazard Analysis is not an exact science it also relies on 
engineering expertise and engineering judgment.  Hazard Analysis is an 
important tool in the design process, requirements validation and risk 
management. 
                                            
20 Larson, Wiley J., and James R. Wertz (editors).  Space Mission Analysis and Design.  
Torrance, CA: Micrcosm, Inc. 1992. 709. Print. 
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The purpose of this report was to show the value in both FMEA and 
Hazard Analysis.  The value can only be added to a program or project if 
management is willing to take the additional time at the beginning of a program 
or project to properly integrate the processes into the systems engineering 
process and carry them throughout the project life cycle.  This includes 
committing resources to properly training the project staff on these two analysis 
techniques and allowing time for the analysis to be completed to improve overall 
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